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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its emergence in the 1960s and 1970s, ethnic- (including white) studies 
scholarship has analyzed race and class as intertwined and interrelated.1 An 
inherently conservative discipline, law is notoriously resistant to scholarly 
change. As a result, legal scholarship often lags behind the cutting edge of other 
disciplines. Not surprisingly, only in relatively recent years has the intersection 
of race and class become the subject of a growing body of critical legal 
scholarship.2 
A bit of intellectual history helps explain the isolation of two bodies of legal 
scholarship—Critical Legal Studies (CLS) and Critical Race Theory—that 
would seem to naturally analyze race and class both critically and in tandem. 
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the emergence of CLS, which scrutinized the 
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 1. See generally RODOLFO ACUÑA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS (5th ed. 
2004); MARIO BARRERA, RACE & CLASS IN THE SOUTHWEST: A THEORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 
(1979); ROBERT BLAUNER, RACIAL OPPRESSION IN AMERICA (1972); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE 
IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE & THE 
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991). 
 2. See, e.g., EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, WHEN MARKETS FAIL: RACE 
AND ECONOMICS (2006); Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: 
The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469 (1997); Essay Collection, Classcritspart: Part I. 
Thinking Through Law’s Questions of Class, Economics, and Inequality, 56 BUFFALO L. REV. 859 
(2008); Margaret E. Montoya, Class in LatCrit: Theory and Praxis in a World of Economic Inequality, 
78 DENV. U. L. REV. 467 (2001); Beverly I. Moran, Exploring the Mysteries: Can We Ever Know 
Anything About Race and Tax?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1629 (1998); Robert E. Suggs, Poisoning the Well: Law 
& Economics and Racial Inequality, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (2005). 
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law squarely through a class-conscious lens.3 In the wake of considerable 
conflict and acrimony, Critical Race Theory publicly split off from CLS with the 
stated aim of more-thoroughly probing the impact of race on the development 
and maintenance of the law.4 Over the years, the two bodies of scholarship, with 
distinctly different goals, have developed in separate spheres and veered in 
independent directions.5 
This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems will no doubt contribute to 
the literature on the intersection of race and class in modern American social 
life. This symposium is especially timely in light of the recent 2008 Presidential 
election, which undeniably focused national attention on both race (with the 
first African American elected President) and class (with the nation reeling 
from the devastating impacts of the downward spiral of the U.S. economy, the 
home-mortgage-loan crisis, and the torn and tattered stock market). 
There is no better body of law to illustrate the close nexus between race and 
class than U.S. immigration law and its enforcement.6 At bottom, U.S. 
immigration law historically has operated—and continues to operate—to 
prevent many poor and working noncitizens of color from migrating to, and 
harshly treating those living in, the United States.7 The laws are nothing less 
than a “magic mirror” into the nation’s collective consciousness about its 
perceived national identity—an identity that marginalizes poor and working 
immigrants of color and denies them full membership in American social life.8 
But, as in many areas of law, matters of race and class in the U.S. 
immigration laws are unquestionably more complicated today than in the past. 
Fortunately, express racial exclusions can no longer be found in the 
 
 3. See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 
1998) (offering chapters with perspectives on Critical Legal Studies from leading scholars). For a recent 
analysis of issues of race in the law, see LAW & CLASS IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR 
(Paul D. Carrington & Trina Jones eds., 2006). 
 4. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Critical Race Histories: In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187, 
1191–96 (2004); see also Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987) (analyzing the failure of Critical Legal Studies to adequately 
incorporate race into its analysis). 
 5. A 2005 symposium analyzed the need to integrate issues of class into Critical Race Theory 
scholarship. See Symposium, Going Back to Class? The Reemergence of Class in Critical Race Theory, 
11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2005); see also Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical 
Examination of Recent Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121, 122–23, 151 (2003) (calling on critical 
race scholarship to more thoroughly consider class and material deprivation in the analysis of racial 
subordination). 
 6. See Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After 
“9/11?,” 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 315–16 (2003) (“While race and class have been a constant 
and recurring theme in U.S. immigration law, it is only recently that legal scholars have begun to give it 
serious attention.”); see also Ali Noorani, Race, Class, and the Emergence of an Immigrant Rights 
Movement, 31 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFFAIRS 185, 187–89, 192–93 (2007) (analyzing influence of race 
and class on the possible emergence of an immigrant rights movement). 
 7. See infra II–III. 
 8. See Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing the grounds for exclusion of 
noncitizens under the U.S. immigration laws as “like a magic mirror, reflecting the fears and concerns 
of past Congresses”). 
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immigration laws. A by-product of the 1960s civil-rights movement, the 
Immigration Act of 19659 abolished the facially discriminatory national-origins 
quotas system that had remained a bulwark of U.S. immigration law since 
1924.10 As a consequence of this sea change in the law, the nation experienced a 
dramatic shift in the racial demographics of immigration, with an especially 
sharp increase in migration to the United States from Asia.11 
Importantly, although Congress eliminated the racial exclusions from the 
immigration laws, provisions of the current U.S. immigration laws regulating 
entry into the United States, such as economic litmus tests and arbitrary annual 
limits on the number of immigrants per country,12 have racially disparate 
impacts.13 Everything else being equal, people from the developing world—
predominantly “people of color” as that category is popularly understood in the 
United States—find it much more difficult under the U.S. immigration laws to 
migrate to this country than similarly situated noncitizens from the developed 
(and predominantly white) world.14 Nonetheless, because of the consistently—
and overwhelmingly—high demand among people in the developing world to 
migrate to the United States, people of color dominate the stream of 
immigrants to this country.15 
Although racial exclusions are something of the past, the express—and 
aggressive—exclusion of the poor remains a fundamental function of modern 
U.S. immigration law, embodied in the provisions of the omnibus Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952.16 In sharp contrast, domestic laws generally cannot 
discriminate de jure against the poor. This express discrimination against poor 
and working immigrants by the U.S. immigration laws in operation has 
disparate national-origin and racial impacts.17 
Part II of this article sketches generally how race and class interact 
synergistically in the U.S. immigration laws and their enforcement. Part III 
 
 9. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. 
(2009)). 
 10. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 
1860–1925 (3d ed. 1994) (analyzing the political history surrounding congressional passage of the 
national-origins quotas system in 1924). 
 11. For a careful analysis of whether Congress contemplated the increase in immigration from Asia 
in enacting the 1965 legislation that repealed the national-origins quota system, see Gabriel J. Chin, 
The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996). 
 12. See infra II.A.2. The per-country ceiling generally limits the number of immigrants from any 
single country that can be admitted to the United States in any one year to 26,000. See Immigration & 
Nationality Act (INA) § 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a). 
 13. See infra II.A. 
 14. See infra II.B. 
 15. See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights 
in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1499–510 (2002). 
 16. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “INA”] (comprehensive federal 
immigration law passed by Congress in 1952 and amended almost annually since). 
 17. See infra II–III. 
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offers case studies from recent immigration events in locales across the United 
States unquestionably demonstrating the centrality of race and class in the 
modern treatment of noncitizens. 
II 
THE NEXUS BETWEEN RACE AND CLASS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
Race and class permeate U.S. immigration law and enforcement. This taint 
stems in large part from the critically important roles of race and class in the 
formation and maintenance of the American national identity, which ultimately 
rests at the core of this nation’s immigration laws.18 Immigration law helps 
determine who is admitted to the United States and, to a certain extent, who, 
once here, possesses full membership in U.S. society (and thus who is truly 
American).19 The exclusion of poor and working people of color from the group 
of noncitizens eligible for admission into the United States reveals both how we 
as a nation see ourselves and our aspirations for what we want to be as a 
collective.20 
The concept of “intersectionality,”21 one of the rich insights of Critical Race 
Theory, has proven to be an important tool for understanding how membership 
in more than one marginalized group can increase the magnitude of the 
disadvantage facing particular subgroups.22 Women of color, for example, are 
generally speaking more distinctively disadvantaged in American social life 
than either white women or men of color—groups whose members generally 
possess only a single subordinating characteristic. 
Intersectionality proves to be especially valuable in fully appreciating the 
relationship between race and class in the U.S. immigration laws. Many, 
although not all, immigrants are people subordinated on multiple grounds. A 
significant component of the immigrant community—especially among the 
 
 18. See generally PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S 
IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995); VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, MEXIFORNIA: A STATE OF BECOMING 
(2003); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL 
IDENTITY (2004); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA (1991). 
 19. See generally LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN & THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP (2006) (analyzing ambivalence in the United States over the proper treatment of 
immigrants). 
 20. See infra II.A. 
 21. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
51–56 (2001) (defining the Critical Race Theory concept of “intersectionality”). 
 22. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (discussing structural, political, and 
representational intersectionality for women of color); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in 
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (analyzing similar concepts). See generally 
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003) (collecting 
foundational readings in the field of Critical Race Feminism, which is premised on the concept of 
intersectionality); Symposium, The Future of Critical Race Feminism, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729 (2006) 
(analyzing the evolution of Critical Race Feminism from many perspectives). 
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undocumented—is comprised of poor and working people.23 The majority of 
immigrants in modern times are people of color.24 Immigrants as a group find 
themselves marginalized in U.S. society by their immigration status, with 
“undocumented” status more stigmatizing and subordinating than “lawful” 
status (although lawful immigrants are still afforded fewer legal and social 
privileges than U.S. citizens).25 As the concept of intersectionality suggests, poor 
and working immigrants of color are marginalized on multiple grounds. They 
are generally subordinated in American social life based on characteristics of 
race, class, and immigration status. 
In the first century of this nation’s existence, a number of states sought to 
exclude the poor, as well as criminals and other “undesirables,” from their 
territorial jurisdiction.26 In the late 1800s, the federal government began 
comprehensively regulating immigration to the United States; consistent with 
the states’ previous forays into immigration regulation, the U.S. immigration 
laws from their inception were expressly designed to exclude the poor from our 
shores.27 The United States also has a long history of restricting (if not outright 
excluding) entry of certain racial minority groups into the country.28 Not 
 
 23. Compared to the overall U.S. population, immigrants tend to be overrepresented in the lowest- 
and highest-skilled jobs. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED 
MIGRANTS: NUMBERS & CHARACTERISTICS 24 (2005) (“Some have characterized the educational 
distribution of immigrants as an ‘hourglass’ because immigrants tend to be overrepresented at both 
extremes relative to natives.”). This article focuses on undocumented noncitizens in the lower-skilled 
(and more modestly paid) end of the job spectrum. 
 24. See supra note 15 (citing authority on point) and accompanying text. 
 25. See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, 
Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1519–34 (1995); see also Jennifer Gordon & R.A. 
Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2493, 2508–09 (2007) (analyzing the need for immigration scholars to probe the role 
of race in U.S. immigration law and its enforcement); Kevin R. Johnson, Race and the Immigration 
Laws: The Need for Critical Inquiry, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, & A NEW CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY 187 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (advocating increased analysis by Critical Race 
Theorists of the impacts of U.S. immigration law and its enforcement); Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: 
Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the 
Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 535–46 (2000) (same). Critical inquiry into U.S. immigration 
law and its enforcement has increased in recent years. See, e.g., Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal 
Citizenship, and the “Alien”, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 263, 266 (2007); Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos 
Vargas, “Aliens” in Our Midst Post-9/11: Legislating Outsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1683, 1684 (2005); María Pabón López, The Phoenix Rises From El Cenizo: A Community Creates 
and Affirms a Latino/a Border Cultural Citizenship Through Its Language and Safe Haven Ordinances, 
78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (2001); George A. Martínez, Immigration and the Meaning of United States 
Citizenship: Whiteness and Assimilation, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 335 (2007); Mary Romero & Marwah 
Serag, Violation of Latino Civil Rights Resulting From INS and Local Police’s Use of Race, Culture, and 
Class Profiling: The Case of the Chandler Roundup in Arizona, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 75 (2005); Sylvia 
R. Lazos Vargas, The Immigrant Rights Marches (Las Marchas): Did the “Gigante” (Giant) Wake Up or 
Does It Still Sleep Tonight?, 7 NEV. L.J. 780 (2007). 
 26. Gerald L. Neuman, A Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1833, 1841–84 (1993). 
 27. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION & CIVIL RIGHTS 
91–108 (2004). 
 28. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, The Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic 
Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1120–36 (1998) (detailing exclusionary policies 
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coincidentally, the federalization of U.S. immigration law culminated with 
Congress’s decisions to exclude the poor, specifically targeting Chinese 
laborers, as well as criminals, prostitutes, and other noncitizens deemed to be 
unworthy of membership in the national community.29 
In modern times, popular American culture, taking a hint from the 
terminology of the immigration laws,30 often demonizes current and prospective 
immigrants as “aliens” or, even worse, “illegal aliens.”31 Class and racial aspects 
of the stereotypes contribute to the conventional wisdom that immigrants are a 
pressing social problem necessitating extreme measures. The widespread 
perception is that all “illegals” are poor and unskilled.32 Most importantly, “[t]he 
term ‘illegal alien’ now . . . carries undeniable racial overtones and is typically 
associated with the stereotype of an unskilled Mexican male laborer.”33 With 
both racial and class components, the stereotype helps to rationalize the harsh 
legal treatment of “illegal aliens” and aggressive enforcement of the U.S. 
immigration laws through, among other things, force, technology, and fences. 
One peculiar feature of the U.S. immigration laws, which has facilitated the 
promulgation of harsh and extreme immigration laws and policies over the 
course of U.S. history, warrants comment: Unlike mainstream constitutional 
law in which the courts are responsible for vindicating the rights of discrete and 
insular minorities,34 the courts generally defer to the immigration decisions of 
 
enacted in U.S. immigration laws as well as the national-origins quotas system that “reflects this 
nation’s preoccupation with its ethnic balance”). 
 29. See generally BILL ONG HING, MAKING & REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH 
IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850–1990 (1993) (documenting history of Chinese exclusion and related laws); 
LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS & THE SHAPING OF MODERN 
IMMIGRATION LAW (1995) (same); RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A 
HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS (1998) (same). 
 30. E.g., INA § 212(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (“Any alien who . . . is likely at any time to 
become a public charge is inadmissible.”) 
 31. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS & THE MAKING OF MODERN 
AMERICA xix–xx (2004) (analyzing the importance of terminology in the legal and public discussion of 
immigration); Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal 
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 264 (1996–97) (“Even if they have 
lived in this country for many years, have had children here, and work and have deep community ties in 
the United States, noncitizens remain aliens, an institutionalized ‘other,’ different and apart from 
‘us.’”). 
 32. See Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic 
Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157, 188–91 (2007) (discussing “illegal alien” stereotype). 
 33. Id. at 188–89. 
 34. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for 
more searching judicial inquiry.”); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 
439–40 (1985) (stating the general rule that courts should apply strict scrutiny review to legislation that 
includes suspect classifications); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (“[T]he central 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official 
sources in the States.”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“Classifications based solely upon 
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence 
constitutionally suspect.”). For the contention that immigrants are discrete and insular minorities 
deserving of judicial protection, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
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the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, which are said to 
possess “plenary power” over immigration matters, from the criteria for 
admission to those for deportation.35 Through invocation of this doctrine, the 
courts routinely permit “aliens” to be expressly disfavored under the 
immigration laws in ways that U.S. citizens—including the poor and racial 
minorities—could never be.36 
For example, U.S. immigration law on its face discriminates against poor 
immigrants, with rarely a reservation raised;37 in contrast, ordinary U.S. 
domestic law cannot infringe upon the right of poor citizens to travel (at least 
domestically).38 Immigration law has permitted race and class to operate in ways 
that are truly extraordinary in U.S. law—almost always to the detriment of 
immigrants.39 The reason is the plenary-power doctrine, which remains the law 
of the land even though the Supreme Court forged it out of whole cloth initially 
to shield blatantly discriminatory laws from judicial review.40 The doctrine 
creates a deep and wide gulf between ordinary constitutional law and the 
constitutional law of immigration.41 The Court continues to invoke a doctrine42 
 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 161–62 (1980). See also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 981 (2002) 
(“[T]he fact that . . . aliens [cannot] vote makes it that much more essential that the basic rights 
reflected in the Bill of Rights be extended to aliens in our midst. As a group that is subject to 
government regulation but denied a vote, aliens are without a meaningful voice in the political bargains 
struck by our representative system.”); Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
1365, 1383 (2007) (“Political accountability is a crucial component for deference, and when legislation 
only impacts people without a vote, it cannot be easily justified . . . .”). When the states have 
disadvantaged noncitizens through various alienage classifications in its laws and policies, the Supreme 
Court at times has treated them as discrete and insular minorities and subjected the classification to 
strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny 
to state alienage classification); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“[C]lassifications 
based on alienage . . . are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a 
prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority’ for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is 
appropriate.”) (citation omitted). 
 35. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) 
(rejecting constitutional challenge to the Chinese Exclusion Act and holding that Congress possesses 
“plenary power” over immigration matters and that its judgment on such matters is “conclusive” upon 
the judiciary). 
 36. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522–23 (2003) (finding no due process violation for the 
mandatory detention of a lawful permanent resident who was awaiting a deportation hearing); Fiallo v. 
Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (acknowledging the “‘long recognized’” view that the U.S. government 
may exercise its power to remove or exclude noncitizens as an aspect of national sovereignty) (citations 
omitted); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80–82 (1976) (noting that the powers to exclude and deport 
noncitizens have “no permissible counterpart” with U.S. citizens); Ping (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 
130 U.S. at 609 (holding that Congress’s decisions on immigration admissions criteria was “conclusive” 
on the judiciary). 
 37. See infra II.A. 
 38. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–05 (1999) (holding that a state cannot provide 
reduced public benefits to new residents). 
 39. See infra II–III. 
 40. See supra text accompanying notes 35–36. 
 41. See Kevin R. Johnson, Minorities, Immigrant and Otherwise, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 77, 
77–81 (2008), available at http://thepocketpart.org/2008/10/28/johnson.html (arguing that corporate law 
principles providing various remedies to protect minority rights of shareholders can provide solutions 
for modern constitutional law of immigration); see also Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: 
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that academics, who contend that ordinary constitutional principles should 
apply to the review of the U.S. immigration laws as they generally do to other 
bodies of law, most simply love to hate.43 
The bottom line is that the proverbial deck is stacked against potential 
immigrants from the developing world. U.S. immigration law presumes that 
“aliens” cannot enter the United States and the burden is on the noncitizen to 
defeat the presumption and establish that all of the eligibility requirements for a 
visa have been satisfied.44 Available immigrant visas are generally directed 
toward noncitizens with family members in this country and toward highly 
skilled workers.45 Various exclusions and other features of U.S. immigration law 
make it difficult for noncitizens of limited education and moderate means from 
the developing world—even if eligible for a family, employment, or other 
immigrant visa—to immigrate lawfully to the United States.46 Due to the 
plenary-power doctrine, the courts let all such laws stand. 
A. Class 
Three features of modern U.S. immigration laws (many more could be 
added) operate to discriminate—directly or indirectly—on the basis of class: the 
public-charge exclusion, the per-country caps on immigration, and the limited 
number of employment visas for low- and moderately-skilled workers. 
 
Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 53–58 (1998) 
(analyzing the continuing vitality and modern significance of plenary power doctrine). 
 42. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 522 (upholding the mandatory detention of an immigrant convicted of 
an “aggravated felony” pending his deportation and emphasizing that “this Court has firmly and 
repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”) (citations omitted); see also Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: 
Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343, 344–45 (David A. Martin & 
Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) (contending that the decision in Demore v. Kim was influenced by fears 
surrounding the “war on terror” after September 11, 2001). 
  Emerging scholarship has analyzed the intersection of immigration and criminal law 
exemplified by Demore v. Kim. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration 
Restrictions, Crime Control, and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration 
Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration 
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
 43. See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, 
THE STATE, & AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, & FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); Kif Augustine-Adams, The 
Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2005); Michael Scaperlanda, 
Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965 (1993). 
 44. See INA § 214(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (presuming that every noncitizen seeking admission to 
the United States is an immigrant, i.e., a noncitizen who seeks to remain indefinitely in this country); 
KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS 
AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 54 (2007) (discussing the practical significance of this presumption in U.S. 
immigration laws). 
 45. See infra II.A. 
 46. See infra II.A–B. 
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1. The Public-Charge Exclusion 
For much of its history, despite the stated ideal that the nation openly 
embraces the “huddled masses” from the world over, the U.S. government has 
not been particularly open to poor and working people seeking to migrate to 
the United States. 
Buried in the American psyche is the deep and enduring fear that, unless 
strong defensive measures are put into place and aggressively enforced, poor 
immigrants will come in droves to the United States, overwhelm the 
poorhouses, and excessively consume scarce public benefits that many believe 
should be reserved for U.S. citizens.47 Responding to that fear, U.S. immigration 
law has long provided that “[a]ny alien . . . likely at any time to become a public 
charge”—even one otherwise eligible for an immigrant or nonimmigrant 
(temporary) visa—cannot be admitted into the United States.48 Over time, 
Congress has significantly tightened the public-charge exclusion and, since 
major reforms in 1996, it has been most vigorously enforced. 
As amended, the Immigration & Nationality Act currently requires the 
State Department consular officers to consider the following factors in applying 
the public-charge exclusion to each and every noncitizen seeking entry into the 
United States: the noncitizen’s age, health, family status, assets, resources and 
financial status, and education and skills.49 Put differently, a prospective entrant 
must establish that he or she is and will continue to be a member of a particular 
socioeconomic class—most definitely not poor or likely to ever become poor—
to lawfully migrate to the United States. In this way, the U.S. immigration laws 
enforce a kind of caste system restricting access to the proverbial “land of 
opportunity,” with certain socioeconomic classes barred from entry. 
To this dubious end, the law requires that each prospective immigrant 
secure a well-heeled sponsor in this country willing to “agree[ ] to provide 
support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less 
than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line . . . .”50 Sponsors, with the resources 
necessary to make this substantial income commitment, must submit legally 
 
 47. See JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 93–96; Neuman, supra note 26, at 1847–48. The receipt of 
public benefits by U.S. citizens, as the public discussion of welfare recipients demonstrates, is also 
deeply controversial and often the subject of heated public debate in the United States; race—and the 
stereotypical African American “welfare queen”—is central to the discussion. See Catherine R. 
Albiston & Laura B. Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales: Welfare Reform and 
Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 HOW. L.J. 473, 476–88 (1995) (analyzing the racialized 
images of Black women in the debate over welfare and welfare reform in the United States); Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-
Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1647, 1665–73 (2005) (same). 
 48. See INA § 212(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (“Any alien who . . . is likely at any time to 
become a public charge is inadmissible.”). The INA further provides that the receipt of public benefits 
within five years of admission also may result in the deportation of an immigrant. See INA § 237(a)(5), 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5). 
 49. INA § 212(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(B). 
 50. INA § 213A(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1). 
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enforceable “affidavits of support,” which obligate the sponsor to reimburse the 
government if an immigrant somehow accesses public benefits.51 
The U.S. government routinely invokes the public-charge exclusion as 
grounds to deny immigrant and nonimmigrant (temporary) visas to the United 
States to noncitizens from the developing world.52 For well over a century, the 
exclusion in one form or another has made it especially difficult for poor and 
working people from Asia, Africa, and Latin America to lawfully enter the 
United States. 
In 1996, Congress toughened the public-charge exclusion by significantly 
tightening the affidavit-of-support provisions to expressly make the affidavits 
legally enforceable in courts of law.53 The unmistakable intent was to make it 
more difficult for noncitizens of modest means to migrate to the United States. 
The very same year, Congress stripped lawful immigrants, even those who had 
paid taxes, of eligibility for several major federal public-benefit programs.54 
Generally speaking, immigrants—both legal and undocumented—remain 
ineligible for most major federal benefits programs. 
 As the existence of the public-charge exclusion suggests, the fear that 
immigrants might overconsume scarce public benefits if the nation is not 
exceedingly careful remains prevalent.55 Consider California’s watershed 
Proposition 187, a law passed overwhelmingly by the Golden State’s voters in 
1994, which would have denied almost all public benefits, including an 
elementary- and secondary-school education,56 to undocumented immigrants.57 
 
 51. INA § 213A, 8 U.S.C. § 1183a. See also Michael J. Sheridan, The New Affidavit of Support and 
Other 1996 Amendments to Immigration and Welfare Provisions Designed to Prevent Aliens from 
Becoming Public Charges, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 741, 752–65 (1998) (describing the various income 
requirements for immigrant sponsors, as well as the legal effect of a sponsor’s affidavit of support); 
Kevin K. Ban, The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: Are You 
Wealthy Enough to Be Reunited with Your Alien Family Members?, 05-99 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (May 
1999) (explaining how the affidavit of support is now a statutorily prescribed document rather than one 
submitted upon the Attorney General’s request). 
 52. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2007 (2008) (Table XX), available at 
http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY07AnnualReportTableXX.pdf (listing grounds for refusing visas, 
including a significant number of public charge exclusions). The U.S. Department of State visa statistics 
from 2000 to the present that show the invocation of the various exclusion grounds are collected at 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/statistics/statistics_1476.html. 
 53. INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(ii) (as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)). 
 54. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105. Two years later, Congress restored certain benefits to lawful immigrants. See 
Noncitizen Benefit Clarification and Other Technical Amendments Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, 
112 Stat. 2926. Scholars have analyzed the negative impacts of welfare reform and the 1996 reforms to 
the public charge exclusions on noncitizens. See, e.g., Aldana, supra note 25, at 272–78; Bill Ong Hing, 
Don’t Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor: Conflicted Immigrant Stories and Welfare Reform, 33 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (1998); Francine J. Lipman, Bearing Witness to Economic Injustices of 
Undocumented Immigrant Families: A New Class of “Undeserving” Poor, 7 NEV. L.J. 736 (2007); Lisa 
Sun-Hee Park, Perpetuation of Poverty Through “Public Charge,” 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1161 (2001). 
 55. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 152–56. 
 56. This part of Proposition 187 would seem to run afoul of the Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler 
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), which struck down a Texas law that as a practical matter denied most 
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Concern with the socioeconomic class of today’s immigrants bolstered by deep-
seated anti-Mexican animus, combined with legitimate concerns about 
immigration control, contributed to a landslide (2:1) vote in support of the 
measure.58 Proposition 187 served as a model followed by many other states and 
localities that passed laws directed at regulating immigration and immigrants.59 
Although judicial intervention prevented the bulk of the initiative from ever 
going into effect, the passage of Proposition 187 unquestionably signaled to 
Congress the widespread public discomfort with immigration, specifically with 
undocumented immigration, and public benefit receipt by immigrants. Not long 
after, Congress in 1996 passed a welfare-reform bill that achieved the bulk of its 
fiscal savings by denying legal immigrants access to many federal-benefit 
programs (undocumented immigrants had previously been ineligible for those 
programs)60 and increased funding for greatly heightened enforcement measures 
along the U.S.–Mexico border.61 
 
undocumented children, including many of Mexican ancestry, living in Texas access to public 
elementary and secondary schools. See also Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, The Education of 
Undocumented Children and the Polity, in IMMIGRATION STORIES, supra note 42, at 197 (analyzing the 
factual and legal background of Plyler). 
 57. A court invalidated most of Proposition 187 as an unconstitutional intrusion on the federal 
power to regulate immigration. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 
786–87 (C.D. Cal. 1995). About a decade later, Arizona later adopted a measure similar in many 
respects to Proposition 187, which the courts refused to disturb. See Friendly House v. Napolitano, 419 
F.3d 930, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Aldana, supra note 25, at 275–76 (“What is particularly 
problematic about Proposition 200 [the Arizona counterpart to Proposition 187] . . . is that its intent 
and effect was to provoke even greater anti-immigrant feelings during an important Arizona election 
during which the undocumented became the scapegoat for many of the state’s problems. Proposition 
200 deceivingly included provisions to deny the undocumented benefits for which they were already 
ineligible under federal law. Indeed, the allegation was one of pernicious fraud, purportedly costing the 
state of Arizona millions of dollars.”) (footnotes omitted); Hector O. Villagra, Arizona’s Proposition 
200 and the Supremacy of Federal Law: Elements of Law, Politics, and Faith, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 295, 
309–27 (2006) (questioning the lawfulness of the Arizona measure); Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, 
Not “Sleeping,” Giant: The Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latina/o and Immigrant 
Communities, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1266–75 (2008) (analyzing how direct democracy disadvantages 
immigrants and Hispanics). 
 58. See Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the National 
Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REV. 555, 556 (1996) (referring to support for Proposition 187 and similar 
statutes as “wide and deep”); Johnson, supra note 25, at 1568–74 (analyzing Proposition 187 campaign); 
see also Ruben J. Garcia, Comment, Critical Race Theory and Proposition 187: The Racial Politics of 
Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 118, 129–31 (1995) (discussing Proposition 187 
campaign); Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California’s 
Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629, 650–51 
(1995) (documenting the anti-Mexican sentiment at the core of the campaign in support of the 
initiative); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the 
Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425 (1995) (considering the Equal 
Protection doctrine applicable to state laws affecting immigrants). 
 59. Bosniak, supra note 58, at 556 n.3. 
 60. See supra note 54 (citing 1996 welfare-reform law). 
 61. See infra text accompanying note 109. 
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2. Per-Country Ceilings 
The U.S. immigration laws include what are known as per-country ceilings 
that generally limit the number of immigrants from any one country in a year to 
approximately 26,000.62 The limits apply uniformly however great the demand 
of the citizens of a particular country to come to the United States. Although 
facially neutral, the ceilings in operation have both class and nationality (and 
thus racial) impacts.63 This is no surprise. Indeed, Congress extended the per-
country ceilings to the Western Hemisphere, with the hope expressed of 
avoiding a flood of migration from Latin America to the United States.64 
Under the Immigration & Nationality Act, countries with much less demand 
among its citizens for immigrating to the United States, such as Iceland, 
Denmark, and Sweden, enjoy the same annual ceilings as countries like Mexico, 
the Philippines, India, and China. For the latter, demand to migrate to this 
country greatly exceeds those countries’ maximum annual immigration ceiling. 
Although there are important exceptions to the ceilings (for example, for 
immediate relatives),65 the per-country limits nonetheless create long lines of 
prospective immigrants from certain countries, such as Mexico, the Philippines, 
India, and China, and significantly shorter or nonexistent lines for similarly 
situated people seeking certain visas from almost all other nations.66 
For example, in August 2008, the State Department was processing first-
preference immigrant visas filed in March 2002 for children of U.S. citizens 
from all countries except for Mexico (for which the State Department was 
processing August 1992 applications) and the Philippines (processing March 
1992 applications).67 Natives of Mexico and the Philippines thus had to wait a 
decade longer to rejoin their parents than similarly situated noncitizens from 
other nations. Fourth-preference immigrant visas for brothers and sisters of 
adult U.S. citizens filed in September 1997 were being processed for applicants 
from all but a few countries, including the Philippines (processing March 1986 
 
 62. See INA § 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3). Some immigrants, such as noncitizen spouses of 
U.S. citizens, are not subject to this ceiling. See INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A)(i) 
(providing for exemption from per-country ceiling for immediate relatives of U.S. citizens). 
 63. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and the Limits of Loving, 
2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 359–60 (offering examples of disproportionate impacts of per country ceilings); 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality, and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 319, 321 
(1993) (commenting on disparate racial impacts of per-country ceilings); Jan C. Ting, “Other Than a 
Chinaman”: How U.S. Immigration Law Resulted From and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and 
Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 301, 309 (1995) (same); Bernard 
Trujillo, Immigrant Visa Distribution: The Case of Mexico, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 713, 719–22 (2000) 
(demonstrating how annual ceilings on certain immigrant admissions from a single country have 
disproportionate impacts on prospective immigrants from Mexico, as well as noncitizens from several 
other developing nations, because demand for immigration from those nations for reasons of proximity, 
jobs, and family ties, greatly exceeds the annual ceiling). 
 64. See Johnson, supra note 28, at 1131–33. 
 65. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 66. Johnson, supra note 28, at 1133. 
 67. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 8 VISA BULLETIN 121 (Aug. 2008), available at http:// 
travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_4310.html. 
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applications), whose nationals had to wait more than ten years longer than all 
other similarly situated noncitizens.68 
Notably, as these examples illustrate, some prospective immigrants may be 
forced to wait more than twenty years to immigrate lawfully to the United States 
and to rejoin close family members. Understandably finding such long waits to 
be unrealistic as well as onerous, many perspective immigrants are undoubtedly 
tempted to circumvent the immigration laws. 
And, in many respects, these are the fortunate noncitizens. For many 
noncitizens without family members in this country or high-level employment 
skills, there is simply no line at all in which they can wait to immigrate lawfully 
to this country.69 Absent legal avenues for migrating to the United States, the 
frequently-voiced objection that undocumented immigrants should “wait in 
line,” as lawful immigrants must, makes no sense. 
Given the lower average annual incomes in the developing world compared 
to those in this country and the relatively great economic opportunity available 
in the United States, the per-country ceilings have class and racial impacts, 
tending to disproportionately affect people of color from developing nations. 
Many low- and medium-skilled workers of color from those nations seek to 
immigrate to the United States to pursue superior economic opportunities. 
Prospective immigrants from nations with demand much greater than the fixed 
annual ceilings—namely, developing nations populated by people of color—
encounter much longer lines for admission in certain visa categories than 
similarly situated prospective immigrants from other nations. 
3. Limited Employment Visas 
Scholars, as well as many employers, have long expressed concern with the 
number and type of employment visas available under the U.S. immigration 
laws. One common criticism is that the numerical limits and various other 
requirements for immigrant visas based on employment skills are not 
adequately calibrated to the nation’s need for labor.70 
Importantly, the limited employment visas available under the Immigration 
& Nationality Act are much more plentiful for highly-skilled workers than for 
moderately-skilled and unskilled ones. Indeed, few legal avenues are open for 
unskilled workers without relatives in the United States to lawfully immigrate 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. See infra II.A.3. 
 70. See, e.g., Davon M. Collins, Note, Toward a More Federalist Employment-Based Immigration 
System, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 356–60 (2007); Jonathan G. Goodrich, Comment, Help Wanted: 
Looking for a Visa System That Promotes the U.S. Economy and National Security, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 
975, 985–97 (2008); Susan Martin & B. Lindsay Lowell, Competing for Skills: U.S. Immigration Policy 
Since 1990, 11 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 387, 390–95, 400–02 (2005); Special Feature, Working Borders: 
Linking Debates About Insourcing and Outsourcing of Capital and Labor, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 691, 703–
04 (2005);. See generally Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive 
Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148 (2006) (analyzing increasing global competition among 
nations for skilled labor). 
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to this country.71 To put it succinctly, “[o]ne critique of the entire [American] 
immigration system is . . . that low-skilled workers, as a practical matter, do not 
have an avenue for lawful immigration to the United States, either temporarily or 
permanently.”72 Consequently, many low- and moderately skilled workers 
cannot lawfully migrate to the United States unless they are eligible for family 
visas (and then still must overcome the public-charge exclusion). As a result, 
many are tempted and in fact do enter or remain in the country in violation of 
the U.S. immigration laws. To make matters worse for the undocumented 
immigrants who circumvent the law, they often find themselves laboring in a 
secondary labor market—often without legal protections—for low wages and in 
poor conditions.73 
Even skilled workers often find it difficult to secure visas for which they are 
eligible under the U.S. immigration laws.74 The complexities and delays in the 
process of certification by the U.S. Department of Labor—certification that 
granting the visa will not adversely affect American workers—necessary for a 
number of employment visa categories, as well as the potential for abuse, have 
been the subject of sustained criticism.75 Microsoft CEO Bill Gates regularly 
testifies before Congress about the difficulties experienced by high tech 
employers seeking to bring skilled immigrant workers to the United States.76 
 
 71. See INA § 203(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (limiting the number of employment-based visas given to 
immigrants “performing unskilled labor” to 10,000, while immigrants with “extraordinary” or 
“exceptional” ability are more readily preferred under the statute); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, 
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE LAW & POLICY 244–45 (4th ed. 2005) (summarizing the employment 
immigrant visas available for “priority workers,” professionals, skilled workers, investors, and “special 
immigrants,” such as religious workers). Current temporary-worker programs, see INA § 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii), are also plagued by bureaucratic inefficiencies and 
often fail to ensure the protection of the rights of workers. See Ruben J. Garcia, Labor as Property: 
Guestworkers, International Trade, and Democracy Deficit, 10 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 27, 45–51 
(2006) (describing how guest-worker programs have rarely been temporary or in direct response to a 
labor need, as well as how such programs have failed to enforce governing labor-law standards); Arthur 
N. Read, Learning From the Past: Designing Effective Worker Protections for Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 423, 429–41 (2007) (discussing shortcomings 
of guest-worker programs); David Bacon, Be Our Guests, THE NATION, Sept. 27, 2004, at 22 (same). 
 72. Enid Trucios-Haynes, Civil Rights, Latinos, and Immigration: Cybercascades and Other 
Distortions in the Immigration Reform Debate, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 637, 643 (2006) (emphasis added); see 
also Kevin R. Johnson, Protecting National Security Through More Liberal Admission of Immigrants, 
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 157, 176–89 (2007) (contending that an immigration regime that permitted more 
liberal admission of workers would be better for U.S. national security by reducing incentives for 
undocumented immigration and by better ensuring that as many noncitizens in the United States as 
possible are subject to ordinary admission procedures that help ensure public safety). 
 73. See infra II.C. 
 74. See Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rethinking Immigration of the Highly-Skilled and 
Educated in the Post-9/11 World, 5 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 496–98 (2007). 
 75. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 71, at 295–321 (discussing the criticisms). 
 76. See, e.g., Competitiveness and Innovation on the Committee’s 50th Anniversary with Bill Gates, 
Chairman of Microsoft: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 110th Cong. 18–20 
(Mar. 12, 2008) (statement of William H. Gates, Chairman of Microsoft); Kim Hart, Gates Calls on 
Congress for Science Education, Visas, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2008 at D3; S. Mitra Kalita, For Green 
Card Applicants, Waiting Is the Hardest Part, WASH. POST, July 23, 2005, at D1; Chris Nuttall, Intel 
Chief Calls for Easing of Visa Curbs, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006, at 6; Robert Pear, High-Tech Titans 
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Even so, the bulk of the employment visas under U.S. immigration laws are 
for highly skilled workers; visas are also available to investors willing to make a 
substantial financial commitment in the United States. This disproportionately 
excludes low- and moderately skilled workers from the developing world, who 
generally are not eligible for employment visas but who nonetheless desire to 
pursue economic opportunities in the United States. The lack of lawful avenues 
for workers to migrate helps to explain the continuing flow of undocumented 
immigrants to this country. It also helps explain the persistent complaints by 
mainstream business leaders and organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, about the difficulties of bringing skilled workers to this country, as 
well as frequent advocacy for guest-worker programs by employers that would 
allow unskilled laborers to lawfully enter and temporarily work in the United 
States.77 
B. Race 
Several salient aspects of immigration law have disparate racial impacts. 
Express bars on the admission of certain races of noncitizens mar this nation’s 
otherwise-proud immigration history. The Chinese exclusion laws and the 
national-origins quota system disfavoring immigration from southern and 
eastern Europe, serve as striking examples that the nation today views as 
indefensible and embarrassing chapters of U.S. history. 
Racial exclusions have evolved into new and different devices that have 
racially disparate effects on prospective immigrants to the United States. 
Consequently, race remains central to the operation and enforcement of U.S. 
immigration law.78 
Combined with such class-based exclusions as the public-charge exclusion 
and per-country ceilings, many other devices serve to disproportionately deny 
people of color from the opportunity of lawful admission into the United 
States.79 The limited opportunities for unskilled noncitizens to secure 
employment visas tend to disproportionately affect people from the developing 
world (many of whom are people of color), as well.80 
 
Strike Out on Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 25, 2007, at A1; David A. Vise, Gates Cites Hiring 
Woes, Criticizes Visa Restrictions, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2005, at E5. 
 77. See Camille J. Bosworth, Note, Guest Worker Policy: A Critical Analysis of President Bush’s 
Proposed Reform, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1106–08 (2005). 
 78. See, e.g., Boswell, supra note 6, at 316–32 (recounting how various exclusionary measures 
throughout U.S. history have created structural and institutional racial barriers within U.S. immigration 
law); Eli J. Kay-Oliphant, Comment, Considering Race in American Immigration Jurisprudence, 54 
EMORY L.J. 681, 699 (2005) (“For aliens affected by immigration law, the concept of race is extremely 
important, and causes many immigrants to be treated as perpetual foreigners.”); see also supra note 25 
(citing authorities that analyze the role of race in U.S. immigration law and policy). 
 79. Johnson, supra note 28, at 1133. 
 80. See supra II.A.3. In addition, the diversity visa program, which operates to favor immigrants 
from the developed (and “whiter”) world, operates to decrease the percentage of U.S. immigrants who 
are people of color. See Johnson, supra note 28, at 1135 & n.145 (citing authorities). 
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Moreover, race-based enforcement historically has been endemic to U.S. 
immigration law.81 This continues to be true today. People of color dominate the 
populations of both legal and undocumented immigrants to the United States.82 
They are disparately affected by the various exclusion grounds in the U.S. 
immigration laws and frequently experience roadblocks to their lawful 
admission to the United States.83 Not coincidentally, people of color in recent 
years consistently have been disproportionately represented among the 
hundreds of thousands of noncitizens deported annually from the United 
States.84 
1. Exclusions 
As the moniker “Chinese exclusion laws” suggests,85 racial exclusions were 
central to the early congressional forays into the realm of national immigration 
regulation.86 The Chinese exclusion laws of the late 1800s were expressly race-
based, as well as class-conscious.87 Congress later expanded the racial exclusions 
to apply not just to Chinese, but to all persons of Asian ancestry.88 Congress 
followed the Asian exclusion laws with passage of a national-origins quotas 
system, which in operation denied admission to many southern and eastern 
Europeans—including many Jews—who were viewed as racially different from 
the desired Anglo Saxon norm; the quotas system remained the central 
organizing tenet of the U.S. immigration laws until 1965.89 
Changing racial sensibilities—exemplified by the civil-rights movement of 
the 1960s—resulted in Congress’s removing the racial exclusions in 1965.90 
However, the U.S. immigration laws continue to operate with starkly different 
 
 81. See generally ALFREDO MIRANDÉ, GRINGO JUSTICE (1990) (documenting abuses of persons 
of Mexican ancestry by the Border Patrol). 
 82. Johnson, supra note 15, at 1485. 
 83. Johnson, supra note 28, at 1131–36; Ting, supra note 63, at 310–12. 
 84. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 102–03 
(2007) (table 37) (showing that approximately two-thirds of all persons deported in 2007 from the 
United States were from Mexico). See generally BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, 
MORALITY, & IMMIGRATION POLICY (2006) (analyzing critically increasing numbers of deportations 
pursuant to 1996 immigration reforms); DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007) (documenting the history of deportation under U.S. immigration laws). 
 85. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 86. See generally Matthew J. Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic: Political Economy, 
Race, and the Federalization of American Immigration Law, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 181 (2005) 
(analyzing the role of race in the enactment of the first comprehensive federal immigration laws). But 
cf. Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 641, 642–48 (2005) (analyzing the role of the regulation of marriage and morality in foundational 
U.S. immigration laws). 
 87. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. at 609 (rejecting a 
constitutional challenge to racial discrimination in the Chinese Exclusion Act and emphasizing that 
courts lack power to review exercise of congressional “plenary power” over immigration); supra text 
accompanying notes 34–46 (discussing the impacts of the plenary-power doctrine). 
 88. See JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 17–18. 
 89. See generally HIGHAM, supra note 10 (analyzing the political movement culminating in the 
congressional passage of Immigration Act of 1924, which created the national-origins quotas system). 
 90. See supra text accompanying notes 9–12. 
JOHNSON 4/29/2010 1:58:13 PM 
Fall 2009] U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 17 
effects on various national-origin groups. As we have seen,91 such features of the 
Immigration & Nationality Act as the public-charge exclusion, for example, 
preclude many prospective immigrants of color from the developing world from 
lawfully immigrating to the United States. 
2. Immigration Enforcement 
Unlike the Chinese exclusion laws of old, modern immigration laws are 
facially neutral and do not impose express racial bars on prospective immigrants 
to the United States. Nonetheless, they in operation have racially disparate 
effects.92 Moreover, immigration enforcement disparately affects not just 
immigrants, but U.S. citizens of particular national-origin ancestries. Today, 
Hispanic and Asian American communities claim to be the frequent targets of 
immigration enforcement and regularly complain about what they perceive to 
be racial profiling,93 a practice generally condemned in ordinary law 
enforcement.94 Mexican American and Asian American citizens, as well as 
lawful immigrants within these racial communities, often contend that 
immigration-enforcement officers engage in racial profiling in the enforcement 
of the U.S. immigration laws. Similarly, they claim that their communities 
(despite having large U.S.-citizen components) are generally presumed to be 
“foreigners” subject to immigration-enforcement measures.95 
The increasingly rigorous enforcement of the nation’s southern border with 
Mexico, in comparison to the relatively lax enforcement of the northern border 
 
 91. See supra II.A.1. 
 92. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 25–46. 
 93. See, e.g., United States v. Lara-Garcia, 478 F.3d 1231, 1233–35 (10th Cir.) (defendant claimed 
that traffic stop was a pretext for inquiring into his immigration status), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 948 
(2007); Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 539 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting officer’s contention that difficulty speaking English constituted a legitimate race-neutral basis 
for conducting an investigation of the immigration status of the occupants of an automobile following a 
routine traffic stop); Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) 
(reviewing injunctive relief sought against Border Patrol agents in Arizona for a class of persons with a 
Latin, Hispanic, or Mexican appearance driving their vehicle on highways at night); Ramirez v. Webb, 
787 F.2d 592, 593 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming a preliminary injunction that enjoined immigration officers 
from stopping vehicles on “Hispanic appearance alone”); Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 
1065–66 (7th Cir. 1976), modified, 548 F.2d 715, 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (addressing claim of racial 
profiling in immigration enforcement); Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487, 490–91, 500–02 (W.D. 
Tex. 1992) (granting preliminary injunction and class certification to a persons of Hispanic descent 
affiliated with local high school for unconstitutional stops and questioning by Border Patrol). See 
generally Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 675 (2000) (analyzing racial profiling endemic to modern immigration enforcement). 
 94. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2142 (2002) 
(stating that racial profiling is the great issue of our time). 
 95. See Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 101, 117–29 (1997) (discussing impacts of the prevailing stereotype of all Hispanics, 
including U.S. citizens, as “foreigners”); see also Keith Aoki, “Foreign-ness” & Asian American 
Identities: Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. 
L.J. 1, 7–10, 18–23 (1996) (noting the same classification of Asian Americans); Natsu Taylor Saito, 
Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. 
L. REV. 261, 281 (1997) (same). 
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with Canada, is often pointed to as nothing less than evidence of racism at 
work. Immigration raids consistently have disparately racial effects with the 
arrest of large numbers of undocumented (and many relatively unskilled) 
immigrants of color.96 Tellingly, at times emphasizing enforcement to a fault, 
immigration authorities have mistakenly—and unlawfully—deported U.S. 
citizens of minority ancestry.97 
3. Naturalization and Citizenship 
For much of U.S. history, eligibility for citizenship through the 
naturalization of immigrants had a racial component. From 1790 through 1952, 
only “white” immigrants were generally eligible for naturalization and thus 
enjoyed a legal path to U.S. citizenship.98 By limiting the number of eligible 
voters, the racial bar on naturalization of nonwhites had long-term impacts on 
the political power of certain communities, especially on Asian Americans, and 
on their full integration into American social life.99 
Given the demographics of immigration in modern times, and because only 
U.S. citizens can vote, delays in the processing of naturalization petitions have 
disparate racial and political effects.100 In 2007, more than 36% of the 
 
 96. See infra III.B. 
 97. See, e.g., Sam Quinones, Disabled Man Found After 89-Day Ordeal, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, 
at B1 (reporting on developmentally disabled U.S. citizen of Mexican ancestry who had been in the 
custody of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and had been wrongfully deported to 
Mexico); Marisa Taylor, Zeal to Deport Sometimes Catches U.S. Citizens in Its Net, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh), Jan. 25, 2008, at A3 (reporting a number of cases of wrongful detention and deportation of 
U.S. citizens). 
 98. See, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 196–98 (1922) (holding that immigrant from 
Japan was not “white” and thus ineligible for naturalization); United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213–
15 (1923) (ruling to the same effect with respect to immigrant from India). See generally IAN HANEY 
LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (10th anniversary ed. 2006) (analyzing 
case law interpreting the requirement in place from 1790 to 1952 that an immigrant be “white” to 
naturalize). Black immigrants technically were eligible to naturalize but, given the stigma attached to 
African Americans in U.S. social life, it is not surprising that few immigrants were willing to claim a 
Black identity in an attempt to secure citizenship. Unlike Asian immigrants, immigrants from Mexico 
were permitted to naturalize because of treaty obligations between the U.S. and Mexican governments. 
See In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337, 349, 353–54 (W.D. Tex. 1897); see also George A. Martínez, The Legal 
Construction of Race: Mexican Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 321, 326–27 (1997) 
(analyzing implications of Rodriguez decision). 
 99. See Leti Volpp, “Obnoxious To Their Very Nature”: Asian Americans and Constitutional 
Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71, 83 (2001) (“To be Asian American suggests in the American imagination 
the idea that one acts according to cultural dictates somehow fundamentally different from those 
known in the United States. One’s Asianness seems to be the difference one must suppress in order to 
be a full citizen.”). The immigration and nationality laws also historically have had disparate impacts on 
women. See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Restrictions on Naturalization: The Recurring Intersection of Race 
and Gender in Immigration and Citizenship Law, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 142, 145, 160–63 (1996); 
Janet Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593 
(1991). 
 100. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community 
in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 51–52 (1995); Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The 
Evolving Role of Immigration Jurisprudence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 185, 202–03 (1998); Kirk Semple, 
Immigrants Eager to Vote Sue to Hasten Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2008, at B2. 
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naturalized citizens were from Asia and 18.5% from Mexico.101 Over the last 
several decades, partisan debates over naturalization have been hot and heavy. 
Efforts by the administration of President Bill Clinton in the 1990s to facilitate 
immigrant naturalization through the Citizenship USA program were subject to 
harsh criticism from politicians and pundits claiming that the President was in 
fact attempting to do nothing more than increase the number of Democratic 
voters.102 
In 2007, the Bush administration increased the fees charged for 
naturalization petitions by hundreds of dollars, with a predictably negative 
impact on immigrants of particular classes and nationalities.103 Despite the fee 
hikes, which the U.S. government promised would provide the funds necessary 
to speed the processing of naturalization petitions, processing of the petitions 
remains exceedingly slow with lengthy—and growing—backlogs.104 Delays in the 
processing of naturalization petitions are likely to have racial as well as political 
impacts. 
C. Race and Class 
Race and class historically have operated in tandem under the U.S. 
immigration laws and their enforcement. Examples in American history are 
legion. 
 
 101. See NANCY RYTINA & SELENA CALDERA, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: NATURALIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2007, at 2 (July 2008) (Table 1). 
 102. See Kelly, supra note 100, at 204–08 (analyzing naturalization controversy and how 
congressional reforms significantly delayed the naturalization process); see also Bob Barr, High Crimes 
and Misdemeanors: The Clinton-Gore Scandals and the Question of Impeachment, 2 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 1, 44–49 (1997) (contending that abuse of naturalization process was one of several charges that 
justified the impeachment of President Bill Clinton). The Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector 
General found that the Clinton Administration did not act for politically partisan ends in its Citizenship 
USA program, which sought to facilitate the naturalization process for immigrants, although some 
naturalization petitions were erroneously approved due to hasty processing. See IG Report Finds INS’s 
“Citizenship USA” Program Was Flawed, But Not for Political Reasons, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
1198 (Aug. 21, 2000). 
 103. See Karin Brulliard, In D.C., Area, Citizenship Test is One of Patience; Local Immigrants Face 
Longest Wait, WASH. POST, May 3, 2008, at B1; Julia Preston, Immigration Fees Rise, N.Y. TIMES, July 
31, 2007, at A15; Editorial, Citizenship Fees Soar, WASH. POST, July 31, 2007, at A17. See generally 
ILLINOIS COALITION FOR IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS, PRICED OUT: U.S. CITIZENSHIP: A 
PRIVILEGE FOR THE RICH AND WELL EDUCATED? (2008) (analyzing negative impacts of sharp fee 
increases on immigrants seeking to naturalize and become U.S. citizens). 
 104. See Julia Preston, Goal Set for Reducing Backlog on Citizenship Applications, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 2008, at A13; Editorial, High Price, Poor Service: Despite Exorbitant Fees, the Wait to Become 
a Naturalized Citizen is Three Times As Long As It Was Last Year, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2008, at A16. 
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The Chinese exclusion laws were directed primarily at Chinese laborers.105 
But immigration enforcement has been no less-overtly focused on people of 
particular nationalities. Consider some examples. During the Great Depression, 
state and local authorities, with the assistance of the federal government, 
arrested hundreds of thousands of persons of Mexican ancestry in parks and 
other public places often used primarily by people of modest means. These 
unlucky people, an estimated two-thirds of whom were U.S. citizens, were 
subsequently “repatriated” to Mexico.106 The “Bracero program,” which 
brought temporary or “guest” workers from Mexico to the United States from 
World War II through the mid-1960s, focused on bringing unskilled workers to 
this country to work in agriculture—only to be exploited, as wage and labor 
protections under international agreements for the most part went 
unenforced.107 
Human trafficking through the smuggling of migrants for profit108 and deaths 
of immigrants (almost all Mexicans) in the U.S.–Mexico border region,109 have 
increased dramatically since the early 1990s due to heightened border-
enforcement operations that have made it more difficult—and dangerous—to 
journey to the United States. These tend to affect poor and working noncitizens 
 
 105. See Kitty Calavita, Collisions at the Intersection of Gender, Race, and Class: Enforcing the 
Chinese Exclusion Laws, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 249, 256–60 (2006) (analyzing influence of race and 
class on congressional enactment of Chinese exclusion laws); see also Henry S. Cohn & Harvey Gee, 
“No, No, No, No!”: Three Sons of Connecticut Who Opposed the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 3 CONN. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 1, 21–34 (2003) (explaining economic and other pressures for congressional limitations on 
Chinese immigration). 
 106. See FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRÍGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL: 
MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S 89–117 (rev. ed. 2006); Kevin R. Johnson, The Forgotten 
“Repatriation” of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the “War on Terror,” 26 PACE L. REV. 
1, 4–13 (2005). 
 107. See generally KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, 
IMMIGRATION, & THE I.N.S. (1992) (summarizing history of “Bracero Program”). Demonstrating the 
ambivalence in the United States over immigrant labor, see generally BOSNIAK, supra note 19 
(analyzing ambiguous status of noncitizens in U.S. society). The U.S. government in 1954 instituted a 
massive deportation campaign known as “Operation Wetback,” while the nation continued to bring 
“guest workers” to the United States. See generally JUAN RAMON GARCÍA, OPERATION WETBACK: 
THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 (1980) (documenting 
mass deportation campaign in 1954 known as “Operation Wetback”). 
 108. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop 
Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 2982 (2006) (noting how each year tens of thousands 
of women and children are trafficked into the United States); Srikantiah, supra note 32, at 184–87 
(describing how many victims of human trafficking must endure forced labor); see also Karen E. Bravo, 
Exploring the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 207, 260–93 (2007) (comparing trade of African slaves in the history of the Americas 
with modern human trafficking). 
 109. See TIMOTHY J. DUNN, THE MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S.–MEXICO BORDER, 1978–1992: 
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT DOCTRINE COMES HOME (1996); KARL ESCHBACH ET AL., CAUSES & 
TRENDS IN MIGRANT DEATHS ALONG THE U.S./MEXICO BORDER, 1985–1998 (2001); JOSEPH 
NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER: THE RISE OF THE “ILLEGAL ALIEN” & THE MAKING OF THE 
U.S.–MEXICO BOUNDARY (2002); Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended 
Consequences of U.S. Immigration Control Policy, 27 POP. & DEV. REV. 661, 661–62 (2001); Guillermo 
Alonso Meneses, Human Rights and Undocumented Migration Along the Mexican-U.S. Border, 51 
UCLA L. REV. 267, 268–72 (2003). 
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of color, who are forced to take great risks in their efforts to come to the United 
States because they lack legal avenues for entering the country. 
Traditionally, U.S. border-enforcement efforts have focused primarily on 
undocumented immigrants who enter surreptitiously, without inspection, not on 
visa overstays—undocumented persons who entered on lawful visas but who 
have overstayed or otherwise violated the terms of their visas.110 Such uneven 
enforcement occurs even though approximately forty percent of the 
undocumented population is composed of visa overstays.111 
Congress’s near-myopic focus on increased border enforcement—and on 
those undocumented immigrants who enter without inspection—has both class 
and racial impacts. Such immigrants are more likely to be poor and working 
people of color from the developing world than immigrants who overstay their 
visas and who, upon entering, had sufficient financial resources to avoid the 
public-charge exclusion and to lawfully enter the United States.112 This all-
important fact remains all but ignored by policymakers and proponents of ever-
escalating border enforcement measures. 
In sum, noncitizens excluded and deported from the United States tend to 
be poor and working people, with U.S. immigration law exuding class-based 
biases that negatively affect people of color from the developing world.113 For 
immigrants able to come to and remain in this country, the exploitation of 
working-class undocumented immigrants by employers continues virtually 
unregulated by government.114 
 
 110. See James H. Johnson, Jr., U.S. Immigration Reform, Homeland Security, and Global Economic 
Competitiveness in the Aftermath of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 419, 443–46 (2002) (recognizing that the U.S. government has concentrated immigration 
enforcement efforts on “poor immigrants” despite the significant number of higher educated 
nonimmigrants who have overstayed their visas); David B. Thronson, You Can’t Get Here from Here: 
Toward a More Child-Centered Immigration Law, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 58, 75–76 (2006) (“[The] 
enforcement concentration on the border discourages older patterns of seasonal migration and 
encourages a relatively permanent settlement pattern for undocumented immigrants.”). 
 111. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 2 (Mar. 7, 2006) (estimating that, as of March 
2006, the undocumented immigrant population in the United States was between 11.5 and 12 million 
with about 40% being visa overstays). 
 112. See supra II.A.1. 
 113. See supra II.A. 
 114. See generally Leticia M. Saucedo, The Browning of the American Workplace: Protecting 
Workers in Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303 (2004) (citing studies 
that show significant wage depression and worsening labor conditions in occupations fielded 
disproportionately by Latinos); Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient 
Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961 (2006) (describing how 
“brown collar workers” often fill increasingly segregated and undesirable jobs because of their partial 
“subservience”); Leticia M. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation in the Brown Collar Workplace: Toward a 
Solution for the Inexorable 100%, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447 (2008) (suggesting a new Title VII 
segregation framework founded on the inference of discrimination when all jobs of a particular 
category are filled by persons from a protected group). 
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Unfortunately, undocumented workers enjoy precious few protections—and 
fewer that are effectively enforced—under federal, state, and local law.115 As a 
result of the operation of the U.S. immigration laws, the undocumented 
immigrants who successfully make it to this country participate in a labor force 
that in many respects resembles a racial caste system. Dual labor markets exist, 
with undocumented workers—predominantly people of color—participating in 
one market without legal protections, while U.S. citizens and legal immigrants 
enjoy protections of law in a separate labor market.116 For example, 
farmworkers, including many from Mexico, often suffer severe exploitation in 
agriculture, a sector of the U.S. economy in which labor protections are too 
rarely enforced.117 As has been the case for generations, wage, condition, and 
other protections are but a faraway dream for many undocumented workers in 
the United States. 
To make matters worse, sporadic workplace enforcement of the 
immigration laws by the U.S. government has terrified immigrant (and minority 
citizen) communities and forced them farther underground. In 2007 and 2008, 
the U.S. government, as Congress contemplated “comprehensive” reform of the 
immigration laws, ramped up the number of immigration raids of workplaces, 
which negatively affected many undocumented immigrants from Mexico and 
Central America as well as their families (including U.S. citizens). This is 
consistent with past treatment of noncitizens seeking asylum in the United 
States: In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. government routinely classified tens of 
thousands of Central Americans and Haitians fleeing civil wars as “economic 
refugees” and thus ineligible for relief from deportation under the asylum 
provisions of the U.S. immigration laws.118 
 
 115. See Raquel E. Aldana, Introduction: The Subordination and Anti-Subordination Story of the 
U.S. Immigrant Experience in the 21st Century, 7 NEV. L.J. 713, 716–31 (2007) (summarizing legal and 
other forms of subordination of undocumented immigrant workers in the United States); see also 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002) (holding that undocumented 
workers were not entitled to backpay for employer’s violation of federal labor law). But see 
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic Compounds, The New 
Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1 
(2003) (offering critical analysis of Hoffman Plastics); Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 LA RAZA L.J. 103, 104–05 (2003) (“The Hoffman 
decision represents a retrenchment from a trend in which virtually all jurisdictions that had considered 
the issue found in favor of the workers.”); David Weissbrodt, Remedies for Undocumented Noncitizens 
in the Workplace: Using International Law to Narrow the Holding of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1424, 1425, 1434–45 (2008) (positing the need to permit Title VII 
employment discrimination claims by undocumented citizens in order to conform to international law 
principles). 
 116. See JOHNSON, supra note 44, at 119–25. 
 117. See Maria L. Ontiveros, Lessons From the Fields: Female Farmworkers and the Law, 55 ME. L. 
REV. 157, 169–70 (2003); William R. Tamayo, The Role of the EEOC in Protecting the Civil Rights of 
Farmworkers, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1075, 1075–76 (2000). 
 118. See Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum, 99 HARV. L. REV. 450, 
459 (1985) (“The government rests its denial of asylum in [Haitian and Salvadoran] cases on the claim 
that these are ‘economic’ rather than ‘political’ refugees . . . .”). 
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III 
MODERN CASE STUDIES OF THE INTERSECTION OF RACE AND CLASS IN THE 
IMMIGRATION LAWS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT 
This section offers concrete—and recent—examples of the clear intersection 
of race and class in immigration law and its enforcement in the United States. It 
demonstrates the artificiality of looking at race and class in isolation when 
critically analyzing the operation and impacts of the U.S. immigration laws. 
Because of their perceived negative impacts on U.S. society, Mexican and 
other Hispanic immigrants, particularly those who are undocumented, are 
among the most disfavored immigrants of modern times.119 Their current 
demonization120 fits into a long history of discrimination against immigrants 
from Mexico and, more generally, all persons of Mexican ancestry in the United 
States.121 To be clear, this discrimination has often and unfortunately directly 
affected U.S. citizens of Mexican descent as well as immigrants from Mexico.122 
It is not limited to “aliens” or “illegal aliens.” 
 
 119. See Johnson, supra note 28, at 1136–40. Arab and Muslim noncitizens constitute another group 
of immigrants who have been the subject of aggressive immigration enforcement in recent years, 
especially after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. See Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, 
Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and 
Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 327–44 (2002); Cole, supra note 34, at 981; see also Susan 
M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies 
Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 620–44 (2005) (analyzing impact of “war on terror” on Arab and Muslim 
citizens as well as noncitizens). After September 11, the concern with fighting terrorism came to 
dominate immigration law and enforcement and the national debate over immigration reform, 
provoking criticism. See HING, supra note 84, at 140–63 (analyzing impact of September 11 on the 
immigration debate in the United States); Chacón, supra note 42, at 1856 (“The removal of any and all 
immigrants is now seen as an adequate means of addressing terrorism because the rhetoric has evolved 
to conflate crime, terrorism, and migrant status so completely.”); Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, 
Immigration Reform, National Security After September 11, and the Future of North American 
Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1396–1404 (2007) (describing how serious attempts at a U.S.–
Mexico migration accord as well as eliminating some of the harshest anti-immigration federal 
provisions “stopped in their tracks on September 11” and were replaced by an emphasis on “fortifying 
the borders”); see also Donald Kerwin & Margaret D. Stock, The Role of Immigration in a Coordinated 
National Security Policy, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383, 398–423 (2007) (analyzing how immigration law 
can be effectively employed to serve national security ends). 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 31–33 (describing the modern pejorative usage of “illegal 
alien”). 
 121. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (holding that Mexican American citizens 
had unconstitutionally been barred from juries in Jackson County, Texas). See generally ACUÑA, supra 
note 1 (analyzing this history of discrimination); “COLORED MEN” & “HOMBRES AQUI”: HERNANDEZ 
V. TEXAS & THE EMERGENCE OF MEXICAN–AMERICAN LAWYERING (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2006) 
(analyzing major U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1954 addressing discrimination against Mexican 
American citizens); RICHARD DELGADO ET AL., LATINOS & THE LAW: CASES & MATERIALS (2008) 
(collecting literature on the law’s negative impact on Hispanics in the United States); NEIL FOLEY, THE 
WHITE SCOURGE: MEXICANS, BLACKS, & POOR WHITES IN TEXAS COTTON CULTURE (1997) 
(studying history of discrimination against persons of Mexican ancestry in Texas); DAVID MONTEJANO, 
ANGLOS & MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836–1986 (1987) (same). 
 122. See supra note 95 (citing authorities). 
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Anti-Mexican sentiment, often combined with class-based bias, has long 
been prevalent in American social life. Persons of Mexican ancestry are often 
stereotyped as nothing other than peasants who undercut the wage scale of 
“American” workers because of their willingness to work for “inhuman” 
wages.123 The debates over the ever-expanding fence along the U.S.–Mexico 
border124 and border enforcement generally,125 the proliferation of state and local 
immigration-enforcement measures,126 and the fear that some Americans express 
of the “Hispanization” of the United States,127 reveal both anti-Mexican and 
anti-immigrant sentiment, as well as legitimate concerns with lawful 
immigration and immigration controls. The difficulty of disentangling lawful 
from unlawful motivations for supporting such controls does not change the real 
influence that invidious motives might have in both the substance and 
enforcement of U.S. immigration law and policy. 
An often-expressed public concern is with the magnitude of the flow of 
immigrants from Mexico. Some contend that the United States is being 
inundated—”flooded” is the word frequently employed—with poor, racially- 
and culturally-different Mexican immigrants (often referred to as “illegal 
aliens”) and that this flood is corrupting the national identity of the United 
States as well as resulting in economic and other injuries to U.S. society. The 
alleged failure of immigrants to assimilate into American society also is a 
related, oft-expressed concern. But several recent developments reveal the 
 
 123. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Rakes of Wrath: Urban Agricultural Workers and 
the Struggle Against Los Angeles’s Ban on Gas-Powered Leaf Blowers, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 
1087–88 (2000) (relaying a story of one Anglo owner of a landscaping business discussing his Latino 
workers: “They’re very hard workers, the Mexican fellas, they just need some guidance. I show them 
how they can make more money working for me.”); Jennifer Gordon & R. A. Lenhardt, Rethinking 
Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2008) (referring to the claim of a U.S. citizen that 
he would not “be worked like a Mexican”) (footnote omitted). See generally STEVEN W. BENDER, 
GREASERS & GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, & THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION (2003) (analyzing 
prevailing negative stereotypes about Latinos in American culture); LEO R. CHAVEZ, THE LATINO 
THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS, & THE NATION (2008) (studying popular 
stereotypes of Latino immigrants as a threat to the United States). 
 124. See M. Isabel Medina, At the Border: What Tres Mujeres Tells Us About Walls and Fences, 10 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 245, 245, 258 (2007) (describing the emphasis of the U.S. government on the 
“physical” barrier along the international border that is “conceptualized as a dividing line between two 
culturally and historically separate and distinct nations”); Marta Tavares, Fencing Out the Neighbors: 
Legal Implications of the U.S.–Mexico Border Security Fence, 14 HUM. RTS. BR. 33, 33, 37 (2007) 
(arguing that the 700 miles of border fencing authorized by the Secure Fence Act of 2006 will likely 
result in the violation of basic human rights of undocumented immigrants crossing the border and those 
persons living within the border region). 
 125. See supra II.B.2. 
 126. See infra III.A. 
 127. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 18, at 221–56. See generally HANSON, supra note 18 (contending 
that demographic changes in California are transforming the state into “Mexifornia”). But see Kevin R. 
Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity in a Multicultural Nation: The Challenge of Immigration 
Law and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1364–68 (2005) (criticizing Huntington’s analysis); 
George A. Martínez, Immigration: Deportation and the Pseudo-Science of Unassimilable Peoples, 61 
SMU L. REV. 7, 10–11 (2008) (questioning the claim of Huntington and others that Hispanic 
immigrants fail to assimilate into American society). 
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unmistakable influence of race and class on immigration law and its 
enforcement. 
A. The Modern “Sundown” Towns: Prince William County, Virginia, and 
Escondido, California 
The conventional wisdom has been that federal power over immigration is 
exclusive, with little room for state and local immigration and immigrant 
regulation.128 Nonetheless, in the last few years, a number of state and local 
governments, frustrated by the failure of Congress to enact comprehensive 
immigration reform, and uneasy with the real and imagined changes brought by 
new immigrants—and Hispanics generally—to their communities, have adopted 
measures that purport to address undocumented immigration and immigrants.129 
Class and race have unquestionably influenced the passage of these measures. 
 
 128. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is 
unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”) (emphasis added) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876); Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New 
York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 (1849)). Growing numbers of scholars have 
questioned the conventional wisdom and advocated greater state and local involvement in immigration 
and immigrant regulation. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration 
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in 
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration 
Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007); Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an 
Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121 (1994); see also Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule 
of Law: What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 463–
65 (2008) (outlining the kind of immigration legislation states can enact that federal law does not 
preempt); Matthew Parlow, A Localist’s Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 1061, 1069–73 (2007) (contending that local governments should be permitted to regulate 
immigration in a manner consistent with U.S. immigration law and policy); Rick Su, A Localist Reading 
of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1624–25 (2008) (questioning traditional 
account that recent efforts of local governments to regulate immigration and immigrants was a 
response to the failure of Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform); Rick Su, Notes on the 
Multiple Facets of Immigration Federalism, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 180–91 (2008) (analyzing 
complex issues raised by local involvement in immigration and immigrant law). 
 129. Compare Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517–21 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (invalidating city 
immigration ordinance on federal preemption grounds), with Gray v. City of Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976 
(8th Cir. 2009) (affirming judgment on procedural grounds that similar city ordinance was not 
preempted by federal law), and Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 979–80, 982–
86 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that Arizona law denying business licenses to employers that employed 
undocumented immigrant workers was not preempted by federal immigration law). 
  Many scholars have lodged concerns and raised questions against local attempts to regulate 
immigration. See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the 
Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449 (2006) (analyzing federalism issues raised in immigration enforcement); 
Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal” Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration 
Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2007) 
(criticizing Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s immigration ordinance); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related 
State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 27 (2007) (arguing that any state, county, or local ordinance directed at immigration 
regulation generally is unconstitutional under federal preemption doctrine); Michael A. Olivas, 
Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 
217 (1994) (arguing for adherence to the general rule that state regulation of immigration is preempted 
by federal law); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting 
Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965 (2004) 
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Consider a piece of commentary describing an anti-immigrant rally in 
Hazleton, Pennsylvania, home of a much-publicized immigration ordinance that 
generated national controversy: 
I’m not Latino, but the anger displayed at the rally—held in support of Hazleton’s 
anti-immigration mayor, Lou Barletta—was enough to give anyone with a soul a 
serious case of the chills. . . . About 700 people attended the rally, where some in 
attendance tried to link illegal Mexican immigrants with the 9/11 attacks. Other 
speakers accused illegal immigrants of carrying infectious diseases, increasing crime, 
and lowering property values. If Alabama’s late segregationist Gov. George Wallace 
had been present, he would have wondered who hired away his speechwriters.130 
Along these lines, some local governments have unsuccessfully attempted to 
address the efforts of day laborers—relatively unskilled workers, many of whom 
are undocumented immigrants from Mexico and Central America—to secure 
work.131 “Day laborers are short-term workers who assemble in areas where 
 
(contending that local governments cannot constitutionally enforce immigration laws); Juliet P. Stumpf, 
States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008) 
(questioning state and local involvement in matters involving the intersection of criminal law and 
immigration law); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, 
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001) (contending that exercise of 
immigration power by states might increase discrimination against all immigrants, including lawful 
ones, as well as U.S citizens of particular national origins); cf. Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a 
“Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133 (2008) (analyzing the meaning of “sanctuary” that some cities claim 
to provide undocumented immigrants). But see supra note 128 (citing scholarship contending that state 
and local governments could legitimately play a role in immigration and immigrant regulation). 
 130. Mike Seate, Rage Over Illegals Brings ‘60s to Mind, PITT. TRIB. REV., June 7, 2007, available at 
http://pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/rss/s_511404.html; see also Kristen Hinman, Valley Park 
to Mexican Immigrants: “Adios, Illegals!,” RIVERFRONT TIMES (St. Louis), Feb. 28, 2007, available at 
http://www.riverfronttimes.com/content/printVersion/204874 (quoting mayor of Valley Park, Missouri, 
a town that enacted an immigration ordinance similar to the one in Hazleton, “You got one guy and his 
wife that settle down here, have a couple kids, and before long you have Cousin Puerto Rico and Taco 
Whoever moving in.”); John Keilman, Hispanics Rue City’s New Rules, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 2006, at C3 
(reporting that Hispanics felt under attack by local ordinances like Hazleton’s); Ruben Navarrette Jr., 
Hate in the Immigration Debate, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 29, 2007, at G3 (observing that the 
anti-immigrant cause has become distinctly anti-Mexican as shown by the hate mail that he (a 
prominent national commentator and native-born U.S. citizen educated at Harvard College) regularly 
receives, including mail calling him a “dirty Latino” who should go “back to Mexico”); Michael Powell 
& Michelle García, Pa. City Puts Illegal Immigrants on Notice, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2006, at A3 
(same). 
 131. See, e.g., Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1034 (D. Ariz. 2008) (invalidating 
an ordinance banning sidewalk solicitation as a violation of the First Amendment); Comite de 
Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F. Supp. 2d 952, 955, 961–62, 970 (C.D. 
Cal. 2006) (striking down a city ordinance that targeted day laborers in practice by prohibiting speech 
for solicitation of employment); Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Burke, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16520, at *43 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2000) (acknowledging the plight of day laborers who feel 
“compelled to take to the streets to look for day work,” as well as the need to solve problems 
“stemming from reckless vehicle-addressed solicitation” but finding an ordinance limiting employment 
solicitation “is not that solution”). Some cities also have responded to growing Hispanic populations by 
seeking to regulate—in some cases ban—trucks that sell tacos and other Mexican foods. See Hispanic 
Taco Vendors of Wash. v. City of Pasco, 994 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the denial of 
injunctive relief seeking to halt enforcement of local law requiring the licensing of taco trucks and other 
street vendors); Miguel Bustillo, Hold the Tacos, New Orleans Says, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2007, at A1 
(reporting on local taco-truck ban in New Orleans area); see also Garrett Therolf, Taco Trucks Can 
Stay Parked, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, at B1 (reporting on court injunction barring enforcement of 
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they are likely to be visible to potential employers—typically sidewalks, parking 
lots, and around construction-supply stores.”132 These laborers are among the 
most vulnerable workers in the workforce, often subject to exploitation by 
employers, including nonpayment of wages and being required to work in 
substandard working conditions.133 
1. Prince William County, Virginia 
In 2007, Prince William County, Virginia, responded to an increase of 
Hispanics settling in the community by adopting a measure that required police 
officers to check the immigration status of anyone accused of breaking the law, 
whether for speeding or shoplifting, if the officer believed for some reason that 
the person was in the country unlawfully.134 Affording such broad discretion to 
law enforcement officers unfortunately creates the serious potential for racial 
profiling and related abuses.135 Fearful of the impacts of the enforcement of the 
new law, Hispanic immigrants and citizens reportedly have moved out of Prince 
William County, to the dismay of some businesses and the approval of some 
white residents.136 
 
Los Angeles County taco truck ordinance, which grew out of a complex dispute between owners of 
Mexican restaurants and taco trucks). 
 132. Margaret Hobbins, Note & Comment, The Day Laborer Debate: Small Town, U.S.A. Takes on 
Federal Immigration Law Regarding Undocumented Workers, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 111, 114 (2007) 
(footnotes omitted). For studies of day laborers, see ABEL VALENZUELA, JR. & EDWIN MELÉNDEZ, 
DAY LABOR IN NEW YORK: FINDINGS FROM THE NYDL SURVEY (Apr. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/pubs/papers/pdf/ csup3_NYDLS.pdf (focusing on day laborers in 
New York City); ABEL VALENZUELA, JR. ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED 
STATES (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/ issr/csup/index.php (discussing the daily 
lives of day laborers and the conditions they face). 
 133. See, e.g., Anna Gorman, A Darker State Economy Sends Day Laborers Packing, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 1, 2008, at B1 (reporting that economic decline resulted in a decision by some day laborers to 
return to their native countries). For analysis of the legal issues facing day laborers, see Analiz 
DeLeon-Vargas, Comment, The Plight of Immigrant Day Laborers: Why They Deserve Protection 
Under the Law, 10 SCHOLAR 241 (2008); Hobbins, supra note 132, at 113–20; Lisa Zamd, All in a Day’s 
Work: Advocating the Employment Rights of Day Laborers, 3 MODERN AM. 56, 56–57 (2007); see also 
JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 191–92 (2005) 
(discussing efforts to organize day laborers); Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public 
Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 891, 912–23 (2008) (summarizing how various legal-services programs 
address legal issues of undocumented immigrants, including day laborers). 
 134. See Nick Miroff & Kristen Mack, After Vote, Pr. William Immigrant Plan Faces Hurdles, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2007, at A1. The Prince William County measure implicates a larger—and much-
contested—question about the role of state and local police agencies in the enforcement of the U.S. 
immigration laws. Compare Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent 
Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005) (advocating such 
cooperation), with Kittrie, supra note 129, at 1466–74, 1487–92 (analyzing federalism issues raised in 
local police involvement in immigration enforcement), and Huyen Pham, supra note 129, at 998–1003 
(contending that local police cannot constitutionally cooperate in the enforcement of the federal 
immigration laws). 
 135. See supra II.B.2. 
 136. Nick Miroff, A Hispanic Population in Decline; Illegal Immigrant Policy Alters Pr. William on 
Many Levels, WASH. POST, July 10, 2008, at A1. 
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Supporters of the local immigration measures have contended that the law 
will promote “self-deportation” of undocumented immigrants.137 However, the 
Hispanics moving out of Prince William County appear to be moving to 
neighboring localities and states rather than leaving the country.138 
2. Escondido, California 
Another local government that has sought to deter Hispanic immigrants 
(and perhaps U.S. citizens) from remaining in its jurisdiction is the city of 
Escondido, California, which is located north of San Diego not far from the 
U.S.–Mexico border. In the last few years, Escondido has tried to discourage 
undocumented immigrants from being visible in the city limits through a 
number of aggressive means, including passing an ordinance—which the city 
later rescinded in the face of a formidable legal challenge139—barring landlords 
from renting to undocumented immigrants, implementing immigration sweeps, 
and pursuing aggressive enforcement of other laws.140 
Escondido has attacked undocumented immigration indirectly by, among 
other things, increasingly citing residents for code violations such as garage 
conversions, graffiti, and junk cars.141 Like other municipalities, Escondido city 
officials considered a policy restricting drivers from picking up day laborers.142 
One of the local police department’s most controversial moves was to target 
unlicensed drivers through the use of traffic checkpoints, which disparately 
affected undocumented immigrants who are ineligible in California (and many 
other states) for driver’s licenses.143 Claiming in effect that the city’s motives are 
 
 137. E.g., Thomas G. Tancredo, U.S. Representative (Colo.), A New Strategy for Control of Illegal 
Immigration, Remarks at the Heritage Foundation (Sept. 21, 2006), in HERITAGE LECTURES, Oct. 26, 
2006, at 5; Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal 
Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 160–61 (2008). The U.S. government offered a short-
lived—because it was unsuccessful—campaign encouraging undocumented immigrants to turn 
themselves in and effectively self-deport. See Amy Taxin, Federal “Self-Deportation” Pilot Program 
Ends Today a Flop, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB., Aug. 22, 2008. 
 138. See Miroff, supra note 136. 
 139. See Kristina M. Campbell, Local Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinances: A Legal, Policy, 
and Litigation Analysis, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1041, 1056–57 (2007) (analyzing litigation resulting in 
settlement of a legal challenge to the Escondido ordinance barring landlords from renting to 
undocumented immigrants). 
 140. See Anna Gorman, Undocumented? Unwelcome; Escondido is Using a Wave of Policies to Try 
to Drive Away Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at B1; see also Catherine Slack, Municipal 
Targeting of Undocumented Immigrants’ Travel in the Post 9/11 Suburbs: Waukegan, Illinois Case 
Study, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 485 (2008) (analyzing effects of efforts of Illinois city to regulate travel of 
undocumented immigrants). 
 141. Id. Such methods reflect a practice that has been described as discrimination by proxy, namely 
reliance on a race-neutral proxy correlated with Hispanic identity to discriminate against Hispanic 
citizens and immigrants. See Kevin R. Johnson & George Martínez, Discrimination by Proxy: The Case 
of Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1274–76 (2000). 
 142. See Steve Lopez, Migrant Has Tough Message to Others, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at B1; see 
also supra text accompanying notes 131–33 (discussing localities that have sought to regulate day 
laborers). 
 143. In 2007, “the department set up 18 license checkpoints, resulting in 293 impounded cars, 14 
arrests, and 296 citations.” Gorman, supra note 140. 
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nothing less than invidious, a retired sheriff observed that the city is in fact 
“‘looking for a way to reduce the number of brown people’” in Escondido.144 
Like Prince William County’s, Escondido’s approach has been described as 
a method encouraging “attrition: making life as difficult as possible for 
undocumented immigrants in the hope that they’ll self-deport back home.”145 
Fulfillment of this hope seems unlikely, given that residence is possible in other 
nearby jurisdictions in the United States. 
3. The New “Sundown Towns” 
The end result of local immigration measures like those in Prince William 
County and Escondido may well be modern-day variants of the old “sundown 
towns” in the United States. Emerging in the North after the Civil War when 
many freed slaves migrated from the South in search of employment, sundown 
towns systematically excluded African Americans after sunset.146 Sundown laws, 
often enforced through threats of violence, allowed workers of color to provide 
labor needed in town but without the perceived burden on townspeople of 
Blacks living among the city’s white residents. 
Along these lines, Hazleton, Pennsylvania, Valley Park, Missouri, and 
Farmer’s Branch, Texas have adopted ordinances that bar landlords from 
renting to undocumented immigrants; these laws have been characterized as a 
new Jim Crow, harkening back to the days of legally-enforced segregation of 
African Americans.147 Besides affecting undocumented immigrants, the 
enforcement of these laws may result in discrimination against national-origin 
minorities, including U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents in addition to 
undocumented immigrants.148 
There is little indication that the labor provided by immigrants in cities with 
ordinances and policies like Escondido and Prince William County will not be 
in demand to maintain the homes and yards of city residents, to provide child 
care services, and to sustain restaurants, hotels, construction, and service 
industries in those municipalities. The elimination of day-laborer pick-up 
points, for example, would likely drive the employment of these workers deeper 
 
 144. Id. (quoting Bill Flores, retired sheriff). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Tom I. Romero, No Brown Towns: Anti-Immigrant Ordinances and Equality of 
Educational Opportunity for Latina/os, 12 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 14 (2008) (contending that state 
and local immigration laws are in fact about race, not simply undocumented immigration). See generally 
JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM (2005) 
(offering a comprehensive history of sundown towns throughout the United States). 
 147. See Marisa Bono, Don’t You Be My Neighbor: Restrictive Housing Ordinances as the New Jim 
Crow, 3 MODERN AM. 29, 29–34 (2007). 
 148. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal 
Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 72–81 (2008) (identifying 
how many persons are perceived as unlawfully being in the United States because of “group-based 
stereotypes” tied to ethnicity rather than national origin); see also Howard F. Chang, Cultural 
Communities in a Global Labor Market: Immigration Restrictions as Residential Segregation, 2007 U. 
CHI. LEG. F. 93, 101–04 (2007) (analyzing immigration controls as a form of residential segregation). 
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underground. But this would not likely reduce, much less eliminate, the 
informal labor market that exists to satisfy the economy’s thirst for inexpensive 
labor. The new incarnation of the sundown town, it appears, will thus have 
unskilled Hispanic immigrant workers by day but will be white-dominated by 
night. 
B. Immigration Raids: Postville, Iowa, 2008—A Case Study 
As Congress debated comprehensive immigration reform beginning in late 
2006,149 the Bush administration increasingly employed immigration raids in the 
interior of the United States in an effort to demonstrate the federal 
government’s commitment to immigration enforcement.150 These raids have had 
racial and class impacts on particular subgroups of immigrant workers, namely 
low-skilled Hispanic immigrants. 
Immigration raids are not an entirely new immigration-enforcement 
strategy. Nor are their racial and class impacts. At various times in U.S. history, 
the U.S. government has employed raids as a device for enforcement of the 
 
 149. For different perspectives on comprehensive immigration reform of U.S. immigration law like 
that debated in Congress during 2006–07, see, for example, Muzaffar Chishti, Comment, A Redesigned 
Immigration Selection System, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 115 (2008) (offering an immigration-reform 
proposal); Hugh Hewitt, A New Year and the Old Debate: Has Immigration Reform Reformed 
Anything?, 13 NEXUS 1 (2008) (offering a variety of perspectives on immigration reform); Asa 
Hutchinson, Keynote Address, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 533 (2007) (discussing practicalities of immigration 
reform); Sheila Jackson Lee, Why Immigration Reform Requires a Comprehensive Approach That 
Includes Both Legalization Programs and Provisions to Secure the Border, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 267 
(2006) (discussing politics of immigration reform); Doris Meissner, Keynote Address, 16 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 309 (2007) (offering opinions on immigration reform); Marc R. Rosenblum, 
Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future, “Comprehensive” Legislation vs. 
Fundamental Reform: The Limits of Current Immigration Proposals, MIGRATION POLICY BRIEF 13 
(Jan. 2006) (analyzing comprehensive immigration-reform proposals); Katherine L. Vaughns, Restoring 
the Rule of Law: Reflections on Fixing the Immigration System and Exploring Failed Policy Choices, 5 
U. MD. L.J. RACE REL. GENDER & CLASS 151 (2005) (same); Christopher J. Walker, Border 
Vigilantism and Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 135 (2007) (explaining 
link of failure of immigration reform and rise of vigilantism); Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After 
Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446 (2008) (describing needed changes to federal labor law after 
legalization of undocumented immigrants). But see generally JOHNSON, supra note 44 (proposing a 
more far-reaching reform of the immigration laws than that envisioned by the proponents of the 
various forms of “comprehensive” reform considered by Congress). 
 150. See, e.g., Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration 
Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1092–96 (2008) (discussing U.S. government’s raids of Swift 
Company meatpacking plants in December 2006); Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy 
Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1157–68 (2008) 
(analyzing legal impacts of raids and other forms of interior immigration enforcement); Sandra Guerra 
Thompson, Commentary, Immigration Law and Long-Term Residents: A Missing Chapter in American 
Criminal Law, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 645, 654–58 (2008) (same); David B. Thronson, Creating Crisis: 
Immigration Raids and the Destabilization of Immigrant Families, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 403–
06 (2008) (identifying negative impacts of immigration raids on families, including U.S. citizen children 
of immigrants); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Under Arrest: Immigrants’ Rights and the Rule of Law, 38 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 853, 862–88 (2008) (analyzing legal impacts of raids and other forms of interior 
immigration enforcement); see also Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 
GEO. L.J. 777, 782–800 (2008) (studying various modes of private enforcement of the immigration 
laws). 
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immigration laws.151 But in the last few years, the U.S. government has 
conducted immigration raids in increasing numbers—and with greater 
aggressiveness—at worksites across the United States.152 
The May 2008 raid of a meatpacking plant in Postville, Iowa, constituted 
one of the largest raids on undocumented workers at a single site in American 
history. In the raid’s aftermath, the U.S. government did not simply seek to 
deport the undocumented, but pursued criminal prosecutions of the workers for 
immigration and related crimes, such as for identity fraud.153 The new strategy, 
which devastated the economic and social fabric of a rural community in 
America’s heartland, proved to be especially controversial. 
With a massive show of force that included helicopters, buses, and vans, 
federal agents surrounded the Agriprocessors plant in Postville, the nation’s 
largest kosher slaughterhouse.154 The officers arrested hundreds of suspected 
undocumented workers and detained them at the National Cattle Congress 
grounds, a cattle fairground seventy-five miles from Postville.155 
According to news reports, immigration authorities arrested 290 
Guatemalan, 93 Mexican, 4 Ukrainian, and 2 Israeli workers.156 Shackled and 
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chained, the workers appeared in court and listened to interpreted court 
proceedings through headsets.157 An observer of the mass legal proceedings 
lamented that those arrested 
appeared to be uniformly no more than 5 ft. tall, mostly illiterate Guatemalan 
peasants with Mayan last names, some being relatives . . . , some in tears; others with 
faces of worry, fear, and embarrassment. They all spoke Spanish, a few rather 
laboriously [They presumably were native speakers of indigenous languages.]. . . . 
[A]side from their Guatemalan or Mexican nationality . . . they too were Native 
Americans, in shackles. They stood out in stark racial contrast with the rest of us as 
they started their slow penguin march across the makeshift court.158 
The raid and criminal prosecutions, however, did not end the immigration-
enforcement activities in Postville. A local teacher reported that U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement officers followed up by going to schools 
seeking student and employee files of any person with a “name that sounded 
Hispanic”; the day after the raid, immigration authorities searched “every home 
and apartment that ha[d] a Hispanic name attached it.”159 This is nothing less 
than a crude form of impermissible racial profiling.160 
More than three hundred of those arrested in the Postville raid faced 
criminal charges for identity theft and related crimes.161 Most of the 
Guatemalans could not read or write and many reportedly failed to understand 
that they were charged with criminal offenses rather than mere civil violations 
of the immigration laws.162 Rather than facing simple deportation, these 
immigrants stood accused of serious criminal charges that would subject them 
to imprisonment and make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to ever 
immigrate lawfully to the United States.163 
The rapid pace of the proceedings and the aggressive prosecution of 
criminal charges represented the federal government’s new strategies in 
enforcing the U.S. immigration laws.164 Previously, the U.S. government 
generally had sought to swiftly deport noncitizens arrested after workplace 
raids and had not pursued immigration-related criminal prosecutions.165 Many of 
the undocumented workers apprehended in the Postville raid quickly accepted 
plea bargains on the criminal charges, with hopes of faster release and 
immediate deportation.166 
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In its zealous pursuit of immigration enforcement, U.S. officials did not 
appear particularly concerned with the exploitation of the undocumented 
workers by the employer, although there were criminal immigration 
indictments of the employer. Indeed, the Postville raid may have interfered with 
an ongoing Department of Labor investigation looking into various labor-law 
violations, including the use of child labor.167 One observer critically 
characterized the Postville raid as part of an effort to disrupt union-organizing 
activities among the Agriprocessors workers.168 
Moreover, the human damage of the immigration raid on a small rural town 
was devastating: 
Postville . . . where nearly half the people worked at Agriprocessors, had lost 1/3 of its 
population . . . . Besides those arrested, many had fled the town in fear. Several 
families had taken refuge at St. Bridget’s Catholic Church, terrified, sleeping on pews 
and refusing to leave for days. Volunteers from the community served food and 
organized activities for the children. At the local high school, only three of the 15 
Latino students came back on [the day after the raid], while at the elementary and 
middle school, 120 of the 363 children were absent. . . . Some American parents 
complained that their children were traumatized by the sudden disappearance of so 
many of their school friends. . . . Some of the children were born in the U.S. and are 
American citizens. Sometimes one parent was a deportable alien while the other was 
not. “Hundreds of families were torn apart by this raid,” said a Catholic nun.169 
Months after the raids, the furor over the U.S. government’s Postville 
strategy and the treatment of the immigrant workers continued.170 The title of 
one New York Times editorial—The Shame of Postville171—pretty much said it 
all. Congressman Bruce Braley (D-Iowa) observed that “[u]ntil we enforce our 
immigration laws equally against both employers and employees who break the 
law, we will continue to have a problem.”172 A union official opined that the 
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Bush administration “seem[ed] to place a larger value on big, splashy shows in 
this immigration raid than in vigorously enforcing . . . labor laws.”173 
The Postville immigration raids unquestionably were directed at and 
affected unskilled Hispanic immigrant workers, who are among the most 
vulnerable laborers in U.S. society. Even if one defends the immigration-control 
goals of the U.S. government, it is difficult to persuasively contend that the 
Agriprocessors raid did not have distinctively racial and class impacts. To this 
point, the United States unfortunately has not addressed the root cause of 
undocumented immigration: the more general problem with the U.S. 
immigration laws being out of synch with the nation’s labor needs and the lack 
of legal ways for many low- and moderately-skilled workers of color from the 
developing world to lawfully come to the United States.174 
 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
In operation, and to a certain extent in design, the U.S. immigration laws 
aim to keep poor and working people of color out of the United States. Those 
who suffer the brunt of immigration enforcement are most often poor and 
working noncitizens of color. Almost all of those who die on a daily basis in the 
desert and mountains—a nightmare that continues daily along the U.S.–Mexico 
border—on the arduous journey through the desert to the United States are 
poor and working people of color. Local immigration-enforcement measures, 
such as those adopted by Prince William County, Virginia, and Escondido, 
California, target poor and working immigrants of color, as did the federal 
government’s spring 2008 immigration raid in Postville, Iowa. 
The experiences of Hispanic immigrants provide a stark example of the 
intersection of race and class in the operation of U.S. immigration law and its 
enforcement, which is best understood through the Critical Race Theory 
concept of intersectionality.175 One could look at noncitizens of many different 
nationalities who suffer as a result at the intersection of race and class in the 
operation of U.S. immigration law. Africans176 and Haitians177 seeking to come to 
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the United States, for example, historically have been subject to particularly 
harsh treatment by the U.S. government. 
In some ways, this racial and class dynamic is not exceptional to U.S. 
immigration law and enforcement. As other contributions to this issue of Law 
and Contemporary Problems amply demonstrate, many other bodies of 
American law operate in a remarkably similar fashion. However, because the 
plenary-power doctrine bestows constitutional immunity on the immigration 
laws, the laws have been more extreme with class and racial impacts far clearer 
and more direct in immigration law than in other bodies of U.S. law. 
Immigration law expressly defines who can and cannot enter the United States 
and, not surprisingly, mirrors the class and racial hierarchies that exist in 
American society. Immigration law and its enforcement make class, nationality, 
and other distinctions not permitted in other bodies of law, which results in 
disparate class and racial impacts. 
For better or worse, the United States, despite frequent claims that it is a 
“nation of immigrants,” is not exceptional in the racial and class impacts of its 
immigration laws and their enforcement. The nations that comprise the 
European Union, to offer one prominent set of examples, have experienced 
similar negative public reactions to immigrants from North Africa, with the 
difference of race and class to native populations contributing to sporadic 
nativist backlashes.178 Yet the United States has always held itself as committed 
to more laudable immigration ideals and often purports to embrace the 
“huddled masses” of the world. It is about time that the U.S. immigration laws 
better live up to the nation’s lofty ideals. 
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